Tools: Free How Mcpwall Maps To The Owasp Mcp Top 10 2026

Posted on Feb 20

• Originally published at mcpwall.dev

OWASP published the MCP Top 10, a community-driven threat taxonomy for the Model Context Protocol. Here's an honest, line-by-line look at what mcpwall covers, what it partially mitigates, and what's entirely out of scope.

Before the OWASP MCP Top 10, MCP security discussions were fragmented. Researchers at CyberArk, MCPTox, and others published individual attack vectors, but there was no shared framework for reasoning about MCP risk.

Now there is. The OWASP MCP Top 10 gives us a canonical list of threats. This post maps each one against mcpwall's current default rules, and is explicit about where coverage stops.

Hard-coded credentials and API keys in tool call arguments are caught by the secret scanner. The block-secret-leakage rule matches 10 known patterns (AWS, GitHub, OpenAI, Stripe, Slack, etc.) plus Shannon entropy analysis for high-entropy strings that static patterns miss. If an agent tries to write, send, or exfiltrate a secret through any tool call argument, mcpwall blocks it.

Agent permissions expanding over time is outside mcpwall's scope. Scope creep is an authorization and identity management problem. mcpwall doesn't manage tokens, session scopes, or agent identity. Mitigating this requires time-limited scopes, automated entitlement audits, and unique agent identities, all of which sit at the platform or orchestrator level.

mcpwall can't detect poisoned tool metadata, but it blocks the dangerous tool calls that result from poisoning. CyberArk's research showed that poisoning goes far beyond tool descriptions. The entire JSON schema (type fields, required arrays, default values) and even tool return values can carry hidden instructions. mcpwall doesn't inspect tools/list metadata today. But when a poisoned tool tricks the LLM into reading SSH keys or exfiltrating secrets, the resulting tool call still hits mcpwall's rules.

Rules: block-ssh-keys, block-secret-leakage, block-env-files Planned: v0.3.0, tool integrity / rug pull detection

Package-level compromise is outside mcpwall's scope. If a compromised npm package replaces a legitimate MCP server, mcpwall has no way to detect it. It sees the same stdio interface regardless of who published the binary. Mitigating supply chain attacks requires lockfiles, package signatures, and SBOMs. mcpwall operates one layer above: it catches what the compromised server tries to do, not the compromise itself.

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Source: Dev.to