Pozsar's Bretton Woods Iii: Sometimes Money Can't Solve The Problem

In March 2022, as Western nations imposed unprecedented sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Zoltan Pozsar published a series of dispatches that would become some of the most discussed pieces in financial markets that year. The core thesis was stark: we were witnessing the birth of “Bretton Woods III,” a fundamental shift in how the global monetary system operates. Nearly three years later, with more data on de-dollarization trends, commodity market dynamics, and structural changes in global trade, it’s worth revisiting this framework.

I first heard of Pozsar at Credit Suisse during the 2019 repo market disruptions and the March 2020 funding crisis, when his framework explained market dynamics in a way I have never seen it before. Before joining Credit Suisse as a short-term rate strategist, Pozsar spent years at the Federal Reserve (where he created the map of the shadow banking system, which prompted the G20 to initiate regulatory measures in this area) and the U.S. Treasury. His work focuses on what he calls the “plumbing” of financial markets, the often-overlooked mechanisms through which money actually flows through the system. His intellectual approach draws heavily from Perry Mehrling’s “money view,” which treats money as having four distinct prices rather than being a simple unit of account.

Pozsar’s Bretton Woods III framework rests on a straightforward distinction. “Inside money” refers to claims on institutions: Treasury securities, bank deposits, central bank reserves. “Outside money” refers to commodities like gold, oil, wheat, metals that have intrinsic value independent of any institution’s promise.

Bretton Woods I (1944-1971) was backed by gold, outside money. The U.S. dollar was convertible to gold at a fixed rate, and other currencies were pegged to the dollar. When this system collapsed in 1971, Bretton Woods II emerged: a system where dollars were backed by U.S. Treasury securities, inside money. Countries accumulated dollar reserves, primarily in the form of Treasuries, to support their currencies and facilitate international trade.

Pozsar’s argument: the moment Western nations froze Russian foreign exchange reserves, the assumed risk-free nature of these dollar holdings changed fundamentally. What had been viewed as having negligible credit risk suddenly carried confiscation risk. For any country potentially facing future sanctions, the calculus of holding large dollar reserve positions shifted. Hence Bretton Woods II

Source: HackerNews